* feat(execution): attach media metadata to output entries
Enrich file-type output entries with a nested metadata object
({kind, width, height} for images, plus {duration, fps, frame_count}
for videos) at output-processing time, reusing the extractors from the
asset system's media_metadata service. Unlike asset-id enrichment this
is not gated on --enable-assets: the properties flow into the executed
websocket message and /history for every consumer, including ones
without the assets system enabled.
The path containment guard moves to media_enrichment.py and is shared
with asset_enrichment.py.
* fix(execution): harden output-entry media enrichment per review
- Resolve symlinks (realpath on base and candidate) before the
containment check, so a symlink planted inside output/ can't smuggle
an outside target past commonpath; also covers output dirs that are
themselves symlinks. Applies to both enrichers via the shared helper.
- Validate filename/subfolder/type are strings before path resolution
so a malformed entry skips cleanly instead of raising TypeError.
- Broaden the lazy-import guard beyond ImportError: the enrichment is
called unguarded on the output path and must degrade to a no-op when
a dependency fails to import for any reason.
- Tests: real-filesystem symlink escape/containment, non-string fields,
non-ImportError import failure.
* Fix SVG previews broken by the stored-XSS forced-download
/view and the assets download route force every SVG to
application/octet-stream + attachment. That blocks the stored XSS from
GHSA-779p-m5rp-r4h4, but it also breaks the SVG node output and Media
Assets previews, which request the file with a plain <img>.
Exempt only that case. An SVG referenced by an <img> loads in secure
static mode with scripting and external references disabled, so the
payload cannot fire. The attack needs the SVG to become a document,
which arrives with a different Sec-Fetch-Dest. Browsers set that header
themselves and page script cannot override it. A missing header, from a
non-browser client or a proxy that strips it, fails closed.
The blocklist itself is unchanged; this is a call-site gate.
* Don't let a cache replay the inline SVG into document context
The Sec-Fetch-Dest exemption makes /view and the assets content route vary
their Content-Type and Content-Disposition on a request header, but neither
response said so. FileResponse emits Last-Modified/ETag and the cache_control
middleware skips /view (the filename is in the query string, not the path), so
the inline image/svg+xml variant is heuristically cacheable. A cache keyed on
the URL alone could hand an entry primed by an <img> load to a later top-level
navigation of the same URL, turning the SVG back into a document and
re-enabling the stored XSS the forced download blocks.
Set Vary: Sec-Fetch-Dest and Cache-Control: no-store on both branches, not just
the exempt one: a cached attachment replayed to an <img> would re-break the
preview this fix exists to restore.
Also strip parameters from content_type before building the assets response.
mime_type there is uploader-supplied and unvalidated, and aiohttp rejects a
charset in the content_type argument with ValueError, so a stored
"image/svg+xml; charset=utf-8" turned a valid inline SVG into a 500.
Route-level guards now pin the headers on both branches and the parameterised
mime type; all three fail against the previous commit.
Some long running chaos testing on a 512GB RAM RTX6000 pro showed that this
is a little bit too low for common template workflows switching around. The
original number was just a guess from me, so go with the scientific result
instead.
These were alll non-dynamic (some non-ModelPatcher) code path calling
FreeMemory for management requiring up-front memory freeing. Convert it
to dynamic to avoid legacy free behaviour mixing into otherwise
dynamic workflows.
* Add native Uni3C controlnet support for Wan models
* Dispatch double_block patches in all Wan model variants
* Remove unused grid_sizes assignment in CameraWanModel, WanModel_S2V, HumoWanModel, and AnimateWanModel
