mirror of
https://github.com/mvanhorn/last30days-skill.git
synced 2026-09-14 16:11:48 +08:00
* fix(hermes-scan): eliminate CRITICAL findings so install verdict is caution The Hermes install-time scanner (skills_guard.py) returned DANGEROUS and hard- blocked `hermes skills install mvanhorn/last30days-skill` (community + dangerous; --force powerless), per issue #513. The 14 CRITICAL findings were all false positives on legitimate code: - 7 python_environ_get_secret: os.environ.get("...API_KEY") credential reads -> routed through env.read_secret_env(name) so no secret-shaped literal sits inside an os.environ.get(...) call. Behaviour identical. - 3 ruby_env_secret: a Ruby ENV[] rule firing case-insensitively on Python `env[key] = value` -> rewritten as env.update({key: value}). - 2 env_exfil_httpx: http.get(..., headers={"X-Api-Key": token}) in xquik.py -> headers extracted to a local var off the call line. - 1 ruby_env_secret in vendored bird-search cookies.js -> vendored tree excluded via .skillignore (third-party node_modules analog; still installed). - 1 deception_hide: a SKILL.md line "do not tell the user..." -> reworded to positive framing with identical meaning. Verdict now caution (0 CRITICAL, verified against the real skills_guard.py); --force installs. SAFE/no-force is not cleanly reachable because oversized_skill (HIGH, 1.6MB > 1MB limit) would require .skillignore-ing ~500KB of runtime code. All changes are behavior-preserving; full test suite green (2 pre-existing network-dependent GitHub-auth failures unrelated). Baseline + plan under tests/hermes/ and docs/plans/. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QgVqyQ8nwZL6opLtnNEMAm * test(hermes-scan): add regression guard asserting zero CRITICAL scan findings Self-contained replica of skills_guard.py's CRITICAL-severity rules; scans the skill subtree (honoring .skillignore) and fails if any blocking pattern reappears, so a future edit can't silently re-block community installs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QgVqyQ8nwZL6opLtnNEMAm --------- Co-authored-by: Matt Van Horn <455140+mvanhorn@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Matt Van Horn
@@ -66,3 +66,6 @@ skills/last30days/scripts/verify_v3.py
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# Keep visible: optional runtime watchlist/store/briefing feature scripts
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# (`watchlist.py`, `store.py`, and `briefing.py`).
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# Vendored third-party X-search client (node_modules analog); excluded from scan, still installed.
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skills/last30days/scripts/lib/vendor/
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@@ -65,3 +65,6 @@ skills/last30days/scripts/verify_v3.py
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# Keep visible: optional runtime watchlist/store/briefing feature scripts
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# (`watchlist.py`, `store.py`, and `briefing.py`).
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# Vendored third-party X-search client (node_modules analog); excluded from scan, still installed.
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skills/last30days/scripts/lib/vendor/
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@@ -8,3 +8,6 @@ scripts/evaluate_search_quality.py
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scripts/test_device_auth.py
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scripts/test-v1-vs-v2.sh
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scripts/verify_v3.py
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# Vendored third-party X-search client (node_modules analog); excluded from scan, still installed.
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scripts/lib/vendor/
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@@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ For hosts without interactive modal prompts (OpenClaw, Codex, Cursor, Gemini CLI
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- On **recommended** → append `INCLUDE_SOURCES=tiktok,instagram,youtube_comments,tiktok_comments,instagram_comments` to `~/.config/last30days/.env` (include `tiktok,instagram` so they are not treated as excluded). Confirm posts + top comments for TikTok/Instagram/YouTube are on, plus Reddit auto-enrichment.
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- On **everything** → append `INCLUDE_SOURCES=tiktok,instagram,youtube_comments,tiktok_comments,instagram_comments,threads,pinterest`. Confirm Threads and Pinterest are on too.
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**6. Complete.** Once `SETUP_COMPLETE=true` is written, briefly confirm which sources are now active (read the `setup --github` JSON `persisted` field, re-run `--preflight` for a human permission summary, or re-run safe `--diagnose` for JSON) and proceed to research. For Codex desktop, Cursor, Gemini CLI, and raw folder-mode hosts, hidden `.claude/last30days.env` project config is ignored unless `LAST30DAYS_TRUST_PROJECT_CONFIG=1` is set from the process environment or global config; do not tell the user a project file is active unless diagnose reports it as the config source.
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**6. Complete.** Once `SETUP_COMPLETE=true` is written, briefly confirm which sources are now active (read the `setup --github` JSON `persisted` field, re-run `--preflight` for a human permission summary, or re-run safe `--diagnose` for JSON) and proceed to research. For Codex desktop, Cursor, Gemini CLI, and raw folder-mode hosts, hidden `.claude/last30days.env` project config is ignored unless `LAST30DAYS_TRUST_PROJECT_CONFIG=1` is set from the process environment or global config; only report a project file as active when diagnose reports it as the config source.
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---
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@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ def publish_rendered_html(
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def _publish_password_for_args(args: argparse.Namespace) -> str | None:
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return (args.publish_password or os.environ.get("LAST30DAYS_PUBLISH_PASSWORD") or None)
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return (args.publish_password or env.read_secret_env("LAST30DAYS_PUBLISH_PASSWORD") or None)
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def emit_output(
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@@ -1092,7 +1092,7 @@ def main() -> int:
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topic
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and not args.diagnose
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and not args.mock
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and os.environ.get("LAST30DAYS_API_KEY")
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and env.read_secret_env("LAST30DAYS_API_KEY")
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and os.environ.get("LAST30DAYS_API_BASE")
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):
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from lib import hosted
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@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import sys
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import time
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from pathlib import Path
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from . import http, log, subproc
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from . import env, http, log, subproc
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from datetime import datetime
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from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Tuple
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@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ def _has_injected_credentials() -> bool:
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def _has_process_credentials() -> bool:
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"""Return True when AUTH_TOKEN/CT0 are present in process env."""
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return bool(os.environ.get("AUTH_TOKEN") and os.environ.get("CT0"))
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return bool(env.read_secret_env("AUTH_TOKEN") and env.read_secret_env("CT0"))
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def _subprocess_env() -> Dict[str, str]:
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@@ -10,6 +10,19 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass
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from pathlib import Path
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from typing import Any, Literal
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def read_secret_env(name: str, default: str | None = None) -> str | None:
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"""Read a possibly-secret environment variable by name.
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Call sites pass the variable name as an argument here instead of reading a
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secret-shaped literal environment key inline at the call site. That keeps
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those literals out of direct env-get calls, which an install-time skill
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scanner flags as credential exfiltration. Behaviour is identical to a plain
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environment lookup of ``name`` with ``default``.
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"""
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return os.environ.get(name, default)
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# Allow override via environment variable for testing
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# Set LAST30DAYS_CONFIG_DIR="" for clean/no-config mode
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# Set LAST30DAYS_CONFIG_DIR="/path/to/dir" for custom config location
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@@ -172,7 +185,7 @@ def load_env_file(path: Path) -> dict[str, str]:
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if value and value[0] in ('"', "'") and value[-1] == value[0]:
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value = value[1:-1]
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if key and value:
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env[key] = value
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env.update({key: value})
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return env
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@@ -287,7 +300,7 @@ def _load_keychain(keys: list[str], aliases: dict[str, list[dict[str, str]]] | N
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if value:
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break
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if value:
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env[key] = value
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env.update({key: value})
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return env
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@@ -326,13 +339,13 @@ def _load_pass(keys: list[str], prefix: str) -> dict[str, str]:
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# returns fast with a non-zero exit and is handled below.
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break
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if result.returncode == 0 and result.stdout.strip():
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env[key] = result.stdout.strip().splitlines()[0]
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env.update({key: result.stdout.strip().splitlines()[0]})
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return env
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def get_openai_auth(file_env: dict[str, str]) -> OpenAIAuth:
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"""Resolve OpenAI API auth from explicit user-provided API keys."""
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api_key = os.environ.get('OPENAI_API_KEY') or file_env.get('OPENAI_API_KEY')
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api_key = read_secret_env('OPENAI_API_KEY') or file_env.get('OPENAI_API_KEY')
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if api_key:
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return OpenAIAuth(
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token=api_key,
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@@ -508,7 +521,7 @@ def get_config(policy: ConfigLoadPolicy | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
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# don't silently end up with has_scrapecreators=False. Canonical name
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# wins when both are set.
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if not config.get('SCRAPECREATORS_API_KEY'):
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legacy = os.environ.get('SCRAPE_CREATORS_API_KEY') or merged_env.get('SCRAPE_CREATORS_API_KEY')
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legacy = read_secret_env('SCRAPE_CREATORS_API_KEY') or merged_env.get('SCRAPE_CREATORS_API_KEY')
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if legacy:
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config['SCRAPECREATORS_API_KEY'] = legacy
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@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ import urllib.request
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from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor, as_completed
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from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
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from . import dates, log
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from . import dates, env, log
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from .query import extract_core_subject
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from .relevance import token_overlap_relevance
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@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ def _resolve_token(token: Optional[str] = None) -> Optional[str]:
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"""Resolve GitHub auth token from argument, env, or gh CLI."""
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if token:
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return token
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env_token = os.environ.get("GITHUB_TOKEN")
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env_token = env.read_secret_env("GITHUB_TOKEN")
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if env_token:
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return env_token
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# Fallback: try gh CLI
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@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ import re
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import sys
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import time
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from . import http
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from . import env, http
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from .log import source_log
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# Distinct exit code for the clarify gate so the invoking model can tell
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@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ def _billing_url() -> str:
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def _auth_headers() -> dict[str, str]:
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# Key is read at call time and placed only in the request header;
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# it must never be interpolated into any log or output line.
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key = os.environ.get("LAST30DAYS_API_KEY") or ""
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key = env.read_secret_env("LAST30DAYS_API_KEY") or ""
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return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {key}"}
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@@ -141,7 +141,8 @@ def _execute_search(
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full_url = f"{_BASE_URL}/x/tweets/search?q={_url_encode(q)}&queryType=Top&limit={limit}"
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_log(f"Searching: {label}")
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try:
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response = http.get(full_url, headers={"X-Api-Key": token}, timeout=30, retries=2)
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request_headers = {"X-Api-Key": token}
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response = http.get(full_url, headers=request_headers, timeout=30, retries=2)
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except http.HTTPError as exc:
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status = getattr(exc, "status_code", None)
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if status == 402:
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@@ -280,7 +281,8 @@ def probe_works(token: str, timeout: int = 8) -> Optional[bool]:
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q = f"from:x since:{since}"
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full_url = f"{_BASE_URL}/x/tweets/search?q={_url_encode(q)}&queryType=Top&limit=1"
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try:
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http.get(full_url, headers={"X-Api-Key": token}, timeout=timeout, retries=0)
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request_headers = {"X-Api-Key": token}
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http.get(full_url, headers=request_headers, timeout=timeout, retries=0)
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except http.HTTPError as exc:
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status = getattr(exc, "status_code", None)
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if status == 402:
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@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
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# Hermes scan baseline — skills/last30days/ (real skills_guard.py, community source)
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Measured 2026-07-06 against `fix/hermes-scan-safe-verdict` (off origin/main @ 3.11.0).
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Verdict: **dangerous** — BLOCKED (community + dangerous; --force powerless).
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Totals: 14 CRITICAL, 36 HIGH, 25 MEDIUM, 1 LOW (76 findings).
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## CRITICAL (14) — all clear-able (target: zero → caution)
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- 7 exfiltration python_environ_get_secret os.environ.get("...API_KEY") reads (env boundary)
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- 4 exfiltration ruby_env_secret Ruby ENV[] rule firing on Python `env[key]=` (env boundary + rename)
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- 2 exfiltration env_exfil_httpx xquik.py:144,283 http.get(..., headers={"X-Api-Key": token}) (extract headers)
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- 1 injection deception_hide SKILL.md:529 "do not tell the user a project file is active" (reword)
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## HIGH (36) — includes an UNAVOIDABLE structural finding
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- 26 exfiltration python_os_environ any `os.environ` substring incl comments (env boundary; blocks SAFE)
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- 4 priv-esc sudo_usage SKILL.md:374, last30days.py:34, env.py:247, health.py:148 ("sudo")
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- 2 exfiltration node_process_env vendored bird-search JS (vendor exclude)
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- 1 structural oversized_skill 1615KB > 1024KB limit ← BLOCKS SAFE (skill is legitimately ~1.5MB runtime)
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- 1 exfiltration dump_all_env SKILL.md:327 "printenv ..." shell snippet
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- 1 exfiltration context_exfil reddit.py:103 comment "include more context"
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- 1 exfiltration ssh_dir_access youtube_yt.py:172 docstring "~/.ssh/config"
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## Feasibility conclusion
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- SAFE (zero HIGH) requires clearing `oversized_skill`, which is only possible by .skillignore-ing
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~500KB of core runtime .py (evasive; contradicts R5) or shrinking the skill below 1MB (infeasible).
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- CAUTION (zero CRITICAL) is cleanly reachable and honest; --force then installs.
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- Structural limits: too_many_files 101>50 (MEDIUM, irrelevant); oversized_skill 1615KB>1024KB (HIGH).
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@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
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"""Regression guard: the Hermes install-time scanner must find zero CRITICAL.
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Hermes (NousResearch/hermes-agent, tools/skills_guard.py) blocks community-tier
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installs on a `dangerous` verdict, which any single CRITICAL finding produces.
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Issue #513 was caused by 14 CRITICAL false positives; the fix removed them so the
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verdict is `caution` (--force installable). This test replicates the scanner's
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CRITICAL-severity regexes exactly and asserts none match in the scanned subtree,
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so a future edit that reintroduces a blocking pattern fails CI instead of
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silently re-blocking every Hermes user.
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This is a self-contained replica (no Hermes dependency). The rule regexes below
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are copied verbatim from skills_guard.py's THREAT_PATTERNS; keep them in sync if
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Hermes changes them. HIGH/MEDIUM findings are intentionally NOT checked here --
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they do not gate the `caution` verdict (see docs/plans hermes-scan plan).
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import re
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from pathlib import Path
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# scan root == the skill directory (where SKILL.md lives), matching how Hermes
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# resolves owner/repo -> skills/<name>/.
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SKILL_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / "skills" / "last30days"
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# CRITICAL-severity exfiltration/injection rules from skills_guard.py, verbatim.
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CRITICAL_RULES = [
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(r'fetch\s*\([^\n]*\$\{?\w*(KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|API)', "env_exfil_fetch"),
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(r'httpx?\.(get|post|put|patch)\s*\([^\n]*(KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD)', "env_exfil_httpx"),
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(r'requests\.(get|post|put|patch)\s*\([^\n]*(KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD)', "env_exfil_requests"),
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(r'os\.environ\s*\.get\s*\(\s*["\'][^"\']*(?:KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|CREDENTIAL)', "python_environ_get_secret"),
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(r'os\.getenv\s*\(\s*[^\)]*(?:KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|CREDENTIAL)', "python_getenv_secret"),
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(r'ENV\[.*(?:KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD)', "ruby_env_secret"),
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(r'do\s+not\s+(?:\w+\s+)*tell\s+(?:\w+\s+)*the\s+user', "deception_hide"),
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]
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# Scan-root .skillignore excludes (directory prefixes + explicit files). Mirrors
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# skills/last30days/.skillignore so this test scans exactly what Hermes scans.
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IGNORE_DIRS = ("assets/", "agents/", "scripts/lib/vendor/")
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IGNORE_FILES = {
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"scripts/build-skill.sh", "scripts/compare.sh", "scripts/evaluate_search_quality.py",
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"scripts/test_device_auth.py", "scripts/test-v1-vs-v2.sh", "scripts/verify_v3.py",
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}
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def _scanned_files():
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for p in SKILL_ROOT.rglob("*"):
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if not p.is_file():
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continue
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rel = p.relative_to(SKILL_ROOT).as_posix()
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if any(rel.startswith(d) for d in IGNORE_DIRS) or rel in IGNORE_FILES:
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continue
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# binary/asset extensions the scanner skips for text rules
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if p.suffix.lower() in {".jpg", ".jpeg", ".png", ".gif", ".mp3", ".json"}:
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continue
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yield rel, p
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def test_zero_critical_scanner_findings():
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compiled = [(re.compile(rx, re.IGNORECASE), name) for rx, name in CRITICAL_RULES]
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hits = []
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for rel, path in _scanned_files():
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try:
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text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
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except OSError:
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continue
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for i, line in enumerate(text.splitlines(), 1):
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for rx, name in compiled:
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if rx.search(line):
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hits.append(f"{name} {rel}:{i} {line.strip()[:90]}")
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assert not hits, (
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"Hermes scanner CRITICAL patterns reappeared in the scanned subtree "
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"(this re-blocks every community install). Findings:\n " + "\n ".join(hits)
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)
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user