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ComfyUI/tests-unit/assets_test/test_downloads.py

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security: fix four vulnerabilities (GHSA-779p-m5rp-r4h4) (#14734) * security: fix five vulnerabilities (GHSA-779p-m5rp-r4h4) - CVE-2026-56670: force download of SVG/XML responses on /view to prevent stored XSS - CVE-2026-56671: contain /experiment/models/preview reads within the model folder - CVE-2026-56672: stop inline rendering of uploaded /userdata/{file} content - CVE-2026-56673: prevent path traversal in get_annotated_filepath (LoadImage /prompt input) - CVE-2026-56674: reject opaque/null Origin to close the CSRF middleware bypass Adds regression tests under tests-unit/security_test/ covering all five. * security: address review feedback on GHSA-779p fixes - Fix Windows CI failure in test_get_annotated_filepath: compare against os.path.abspath(...) to match the intentional abspath normalization added by the traversal hardening (abspath prepends the drive letter on Windows). - origin_check: narrow the bare `except:` in is_loopback() to ValueError so genuine interrupts aren't swallowed (review nit). - origin_check: guard .port access in is_cross_origin_forbidden() so a malformed/out-of-range port (e.g. Origin: http://127.0.0.1:99999) fails closed with a 403 instead of surfacing an uncaught 500 in the middleware. - server /view: escape backslash/quote in the Content-Disposition filename (RFC 6266 quoted-string) so a filename containing a double quote can't malform the response header. * security: address CodeRabbit review feedback on GHSA-779p tests - test #3: guard the symlink-escape test with a try/except skip so it no longer errors on Windows CI where os.symlink needs elevated privileges / Developer Mode (mirrors the guard in the sibling test #2). - test #5: refresh the stale module docstring to describe the actual /view gating (view_image closure calling folder_paths.is_dangerous_content_type, the normalising check) instead of the bypassable raw set-membership test. * revert(security): drop CVE-2026-56674 Origin: null CSRF change Per maintainer review, the reported CSRF is already mitigated by the pre-existing Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site check for current browsers, and the null-origin rejection risked breaking legitimate sandboxed-iframe embeds. Restores origin_only_middleware and is_loopback in server.py to their prior state (the Sec-Fetch-Site check is retained) and removes utils/origin_check.py and its regression test. The other four GHSA-779p fixes are unaffected.
2026-07-02 20:44:54 -07:00
import contextlib
import json
import time
import uuid
from datetime import datetime
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Optional
import pytest
import requests
from helpers import get_asset_filename, trigger_sync_seed_assets
security: fix four vulnerabilities (GHSA-779p-m5rp-r4h4) (#14734) * security: fix five vulnerabilities (GHSA-779p-m5rp-r4h4) - CVE-2026-56670: force download of SVG/XML responses on /view to prevent stored XSS - CVE-2026-56671: contain /experiment/models/preview reads within the model folder - CVE-2026-56672: stop inline rendering of uploaded /userdata/{file} content - CVE-2026-56673: prevent path traversal in get_annotated_filepath (LoadImage /prompt input) - CVE-2026-56674: reject opaque/null Origin to close the CSRF middleware bypass Adds regression tests under tests-unit/security_test/ covering all five. * security: address review feedback on GHSA-779p fixes - Fix Windows CI failure in test_get_annotated_filepath: compare against os.path.abspath(...) to match the intentional abspath normalization added by the traversal hardening (abspath prepends the drive letter on Windows). - origin_check: narrow the bare `except:` in is_loopback() to ValueError so genuine interrupts aren't swallowed (review nit). - origin_check: guard .port access in is_cross_origin_forbidden() so a malformed/out-of-range port (e.g. Origin: http://127.0.0.1:99999) fails closed with a 403 instead of surfacing an uncaught 500 in the middleware. - server /view: escape backslash/quote in the Content-Disposition filename (RFC 6266 quoted-string) so a filename containing a double quote can't malform the response header. * security: address CodeRabbit review feedback on GHSA-779p tests - test #3: guard the symlink-escape test with a try/except skip so it no longer errors on Windows CI where os.symlink needs elevated privileges / Developer Mode (mirrors the guard in the sibling test #2). - test #5: refresh the stale module docstring to describe the actual /view gating (view_image closure calling folder_paths.is_dangerous_content_type, the normalising check) instead of the bypassable raw set-membership test. * revert(security): drop CVE-2026-56674 Origin: null CSRF change Per maintainer review, the reported CSRF is already mitigated by the pre-existing Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site check for current browsers, and the null-origin rejection risked breaking legitimate sandboxed-iframe embeds. Restores origin_only_middleware and is_loopback in server.py to their prior state (the Sec-Fetch-Site check is retained) and removes utils/origin_check.py and its regression test. The other four GHSA-779p fixes are unaffected.
2026-07-02 20:44:54 -07:00
def test_download_svg_forced_to_attachment(http: requests.Session, api_base: str):
"""GHSA-779p-m5rp-r4h4 CISA-5 (sibling route): an uploaded SVG must never be
served inline from GET /api/assets/{id}/content, or an inline <script> runs
in the app origin (stored XSS). Even with disposition=inline requested, a
dangerous content type must be forced to application/octet-stream +
Content-Disposition: attachment + nosniff. Regression guard for the stale
inline blocklist that previously omitted image/svg+xml and ignored the
centralized folder_paths.is_dangerous_content_type check.
"""
svg = b'<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><script>alert(1)</script></svg>'
files = {"file": ("evil.svg", svg, "image/svg+xml")}
form_data = {
feat(assets): add namespaced model_type tags and align tag semantics (#14511) * feat(assets): add namespaced model type tags * fix(assets): mark path-derived upload tags automatic * fix(assets): merge duplicate scan specs * test(assets): make duplicate path normalization portable * feat(assets): add loader_path as the authoritative loader locator (#14796) * fix(assets): filter model_type tags by bucket extension sets Buckets sharing a base directory (e.g. diffusion_models and a custom unet_gguf) tagged every file in the directory regardless of whether the bucket could load it, so .safetensors files were tagged model_type:unet_gguf and vice versa. Carry each bucket's registered extension set through get_comfy_models_folders and only emit a model_type tag when the file extension matches, keeping the empty-set match-all convention from folder_paths.filter_files_extensions. Files under a model base matching no bucket now keep only the models tag instead of every directory-matching model_type tag. * feat(assets): replace response file_path with persisted loader_path The old file_path response field was a namespaced storage locator (models/checkpoints/foo.safetensors): not an absolute path, not unique identity, and not the value a loader consumes. Nothing needs that shape on the wire (hash/ID-based locating is the long-term direction), so it is dropped rather than renamed; the storage-root matching stays internal, powering display_name. What loaders DO need is the in-root loader path (category dropped: models/checkpoints/foo/bar.safetensors -> foo/bar.safetensors). Serve it as a first-class loader_path field, persisted on asset_references (migration 0006) and written by every ingest pipeline at insert, so responses read the column verbatim. Like the model_type tags, loader_path is a seed-time derivative of the model folder registry, maintained by the same scan lifecycle (new files seed fresh values, pruning retires rows whose bucket disappeared). Rows predating the column serve a null loader_path; databases from before this stack already need recreating for the base branch's tag changes. loader_path resolves every registered base including extra_model_paths entries; display_name only the canonical storage roots. A file can therefore be loadable with no display name (extra-path models) or the reverse (unregistered files under the models root), and loader_path is null exactly when no loader can resolve the file. * test(assets): lock loader_path matrix (asymmetry, null, persist/read) Cover the behaviour that has no production change but is easy to regress: the extra-path asymmetry (loadable but no storage namespace), null loader_path persistence for orphan files, and the response reading the stored column with a compute fallback for un-backfilled rows. * fix(assets): persist subfolder-qualified loader_path for ingested outputs ingest_existing_file built its seed spec with the file's basename, so outputs saved into a subfolder persisted loader_path (and the user_metadata filename that preview URLs split for their subfolder param) as just the basename: the served locator pointed at a file that does not exist at that path. Scanner and seeder specs already derive fname via compute_loader_path; use the same derivation here. * fix(assets): only extension-matching buckets contribute a loader_path The model-base match in get_asset_category_and_relative_path ignored each bucket's extension set, so a file inside a registered base whose extension the bucket cannot load (e.g. a .txt uploaded into model_type:checkpoints) advertised a loader_path that no loader list would ever resolve, while the tag side of the same stack already excluded it. Apply the extension check used for backend tags (empty set accepts any extension), keeping loader_path null exactly when no loader can resolve the file. * fix(assets): refresh loader_path when re-ingesting an existing reference upsert_reference only wrote loader_path on the INSERT branch, so re-ingesting an existing reference (an output overwritten in place, or a file re-registered after its loader_path derivation changed) kept the stale or NULL value forever. Write it on the UPDATE branch too, with a null-safe change guard so a loader_path difference alone is enough to trigger the update, and identical values stay a no-op. * fix(assets): repair semantic merge breakage from #14796 and master Two textually-clean but semantically-broken merges: - routes.py lost its folder_paths import when #14796's import block superseded the base's, while the content-type hardening added via the base's master merge still calls folder_paths.is_dangerous_content_type. - master's SVG download-hardening test uploads with the pre-namespacing bare checkpoints tag, which this branch's destination validation rejects; use model_type:checkpoints. --------- Co-authored-by: guill <jacob.e.segal@gmail.com>
2026-07-09 17:00:08 +12:00
"tags": json.dumps(["models", "model_type:checkpoints", "unit-tests", "svgxss"]),
security: fix four vulnerabilities (GHSA-779p-m5rp-r4h4) (#14734) * security: fix five vulnerabilities (GHSA-779p-m5rp-r4h4) - CVE-2026-56670: force download of SVG/XML responses on /view to prevent stored XSS - CVE-2026-56671: contain /experiment/models/preview reads within the model folder - CVE-2026-56672: stop inline rendering of uploaded /userdata/{file} content - CVE-2026-56673: prevent path traversal in get_annotated_filepath (LoadImage /prompt input) - CVE-2026-56674: reject opaque/null Origin to close the CSRF middleware bypass Adds regression tests under tests-unit/security_test/ covering all five. * security: address review feedback on GHSA-779p fixes - Fix Windows CI failure in test_get_annotated_filepath: compare against os.path.abspath(...) to match the intentional abspath normalization added by the traversal hardening (abspath prepends the drive letter on Windows). - origin_check: narrow the bare `except:` in is_loopback() to ValueError so genuine interrupts aren't swallowed (review nit). - origin_check: guard .port access in is_cross_origin_forbidden() so a malformed/out-of-range port (e.g. Origin: http://127.0.0.1:99999) fails closed with a 403 instead of surfacing an uncaught 500 in the middleware. - server /view: escape backslash/quote in the Content-Disposition filename (RFC 6266 quoted-string) so a filename containing a double quote can't malform the response header. * security: address CodeRabbit review feedback on GHSA-779p tests - test #3: guard the symlink-escape test with a try/except skip so it no longer errors on Windows CI where os.symlink needs elevated privileges / Developer Mode (mirrors the guard in the sibling test #2). - test #5: refresh the stale module docstring to describe the actual /view gating (view_image closure calling folder_paths.is_dangerous_content_type, the normalising check) instead of the bypassable raw set-membership test. * revert(security): drop CVE-2026-56674 Origin: null CSRF change Per maintainer review, the reported CSRF is already mitigated by the pre-existing Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site check for current browsers, and the null-origin rejection risked breaking legitimate sandboxed-iframe embeds. Restores origin_only_middleware and is_loopback in server.py to their prior state (the Sec-Fetch-Site check is retained) and removes utils/origin_check.py and its regression test. The other four GHSA-779p fixes are unaffected.
2026-07-02 20:44:54 -07:00
"name": "evil.svg",
}
up = http.post(api_base + "/api/assets", files=files, data=form_data, timeout=120)
body = up.json()
assert up.status_code in (200, 201), body
aid = body["id"]
try:
r = http.get(f"{api_base}/api/assets/{aid}/content?disposition=inline", timeout=120)
r.content
assert r.status_code == 200
ct = r.headers.get("Content-Type", "").lower()
cd = r.headers.get("Content-Disposition", "").lower()
assert "svg" not in ct, f"SVG served with a renderable content type: {ct!r}"
assert ct.startswith("application/octet-stream"), f"expected octet-stream, got {ct!r}"
assert "attachment" in cd, f"inline disposition not overridden to attachment: {cd!r}"
assert r.headers.get("X-Content-Type-Options", "").lower() == "nosniff"
finally:
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
http.delete(f"{api_base}/api/assets/{aid}", timeout=30)
def test_download_attachment_and_inline(http: requests.Session, api_base: str, seeded_asset: dict):
aid = seeded_asset["id"]
# default attachment
r1 = http.get(f"{api_base}/api/assets/{aid}/content", timeout=120)
data = r1.content
assert r1.status_code == 200
cd = r1.headers.get("Content-Disposition", "")
assert "attachment" in cd
assert data and len(data) == 4096
# inline requested
r2 = http.get(f"{api_base}/api/assets/{aid}/content?disposition=inline", timeout=120)
r2.content
assert r2.status_code == 200
cd2 = r2.headers.get("Content-Disposition", "")
assert "inline" in cd2
@pytest.mark.skip(reason="Requires computing hashes of files in directories to deduplicate into multiple cache states")
@pytest.mark.parametrize("root", ["input", "output"])
def test_download_chooses_existing_state_and_updates_access_time(
root: str,
http: requests.Session,
api_base: str,
comfy_tmp_base_dir: Path,
asset_factory,
make_asset_bytes,
run_scan_and_wait,
):
"""
Hashed asset with two state paths: if the first one disappears,
GET /content still serves from the remaining path and bumps last_access_time.
"""
scope = f"dl-first-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:6]}"
name = "first_existing_state.bin"
data = make_asset_bytes(name, 3072)
# Upload -> path1
a = asset_factory(name, [root, "unit-tests", scope], {}, data)
aid = a["id"]
base = comfy_tmp_base_dir / root / "unit-tests" / scope
path1 = base / get_asset_filename(a["asset_hash"], ".bin")
assert path1.exists()
# Seed path2 by copying, then scan to dedupe into a second state
path2 = base / "alt" / name
path2.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
path2.write_bytes(data)
trigger_sync_seed_assets(http, api_base)
run_scan_and_wait(root)
# Remove path1 so server must fall back to path2
path1.unlink()
# last_access_time before
rg0 = http.get(f"{api_base}/api/assets/{aid}", timeout=120)
d0 = rg0.json()
assert rg0.status_code == 200, d0
ts0 = d0.get("last_access_time")
time.sleep(0.05)
r = http.get(f"{api_base}/api/assets/{aid}/content", timeout=120)
blob = r.content
assert r.status_code == 200
assert blob == data # must serve from the surviving state (same bytes)
rg1 = http.get(f"{api_base}/api/assets/{aid}", timeout=120)
d1 = rg1.json()
assert rg1.status_code == 200, d1
ts1 = d1.get("last_access_time")
def _parse_iso8601(s: Optional[str]) -> Optional[float]:
if not s:
return None
s = s[:-1] if s.endswith("Z") else s
return datetime.fromisoformat(s).timestamp()
t0 = _parse_iso8601(ts0)
t1 = _parse_iso8601(ts1)
assert t1 is not None
if t0 is not None:
assert t1 > t0
feat(assets): add namespaced model_type tags and align tag semantics (#14511) * feat(assets): add namespaced model type tags * fix(assets): mark path-derived upload tags automatic * fix(assets): merge duplicate scan specs * test(assets): make duplicate path normalization portable * feat(assets): add loader_path as the authoritative loader locator (#14796) * fix(assets): filter model_type tags by bucket extension sets Buckets sharing a base directory (e.g. diffusion_models and a custom unet_gguf) tagged every file in the directory regardless of whether the bucket could load it, so .safetensors files were tagged model_type:unet_gguf and vice versa. Carry each bucket's registered extension set through get_comfy_models_folders and only emit a model_type tag when the file extension matches, keeping the empty-set match-all convention from folder_paths.filter_files_extensions. Files under a model base matching no bucket now keep only the models tag instead of every directory-matching model_type tag. * feat(assets): replace response file_path with persisted loader_path The old file_path response field was a namespaced storage locator (models/checkpoints/foo.safetensors): not an absolute path, not unique identity, and not the value a loader consumes. Nothing needs that shape on the wire (hash/ID-based locating is the long-term direction), so it is dropped rather than renamed; the storage-root matching stays internal, powering display_name. What loaders DO need is the in-root loader path (category dropped: models/checkpoints/foo/bar.safetensors -> foo/bar.safetensors). Serve it as a first-class loader_path field, persisted on asset_references (migration 0006) and written by every ingest pipeline at insert, so responses read the column verbatim. Like the model_type tags, loader_path is a seed-time derivative of the model folder registry, maintained by the same scan lifecycle (new files seed fresh values, pruning retires rows whose bucket disappeared). Rows predating the column serve a null loader_path; databases from before this stack already need recreating for the base branch's tag changes. loader_path resolves every registered base including extra_model_paths entries; display_name only the canonical storage roots. A file can therefore be loadable with no display name (extra-path models) or the reverse (unregistered files under the models root), and loader_path is null exactly when no loader can resolve the file. * test(assets): lock loader_path matrix (asymmetry, null, persist/read) Cover the behaviour that has no production change but is easy to regress: the extra-path asymmetry (loadable but no storage namespace), null loader_path persistence for orphan files, and the response reading the stored column with a compute fallback for un-backfilled rows. * fix(assets): persist subfolder-qualified loader_path for ingested outputs ingest_existing_file built its seed spec with the file's basename, so outputs saved into a subfolder persisted loader_path (and the user_metadata filename that preview URLs split for their subfolder param) as just the basename: the served locator pointed at a file that does not exist at that path. Scanner and seeder specs already derive fname via compute_loader_path; use the same derivation here. * fix(assets): only extension-matching buckets contribute a loader_path The model-base match in get_asset_category_and_relative_path ignored each bucket's extension set, so a file inside a registered base whose extension the bucket cannot load (e.g. a .txt uploaded into model_type:checkpoints) advertised a loader_path that no loader list would ever resolve, while the tag side of the same stack already excluded it. Apply the extension check used for backend tags (empty set accepts any extension), keeping loader_path null exactly when no loader can resolve the file. * fix(assets): refresh loader_path when re-ingesting an existing reference upsert_reference only wrote loader_path on the INSERT branch, so re-ingesting an existing reference (an output overwritten in place, or a file re-registered after its loader_path derivation changed) kept the stale or NULL value forever. Write it on the UPDATE branch too, with a null-safe change guard so a loader_path difference alone is enough to trigger the update, and identical values stay a no-op. * fix(assets): repair semantic merge breakage from #14796 and master Two textually-clean but semantically-broken merges: - routes.py lost its folder_paths import when #14796's import block superseded the base's, while the content-type hardening added via the base's master merge still calls folder_paths.is_dangerous_content_type. - master's SVG download-hardening test uploads with the pre-namespacing bare checkpoints tag, which this branch's destination validation rejects; use model_type:checkpoints. --------- Co-authored-by: guill <jacob.e.segal@gmail.com>
2026-07-09 17:00:08 +12:00
@pytest.mark.parametrize("seeded_asset", [{"tags": ["models", "model_type:checkpoints"]}], indirect=True)
def test_download_missing_file_returns_404(
http: requests.Session, api_base: str, comfy_tmp_base_dir: Path, seeded_asset: dict
):
# Remove the underlying file then attempt download.
# We initialize fixture without additional tags to know exactly the asset file path.
try:
aid = seeded_asset["id"]
rg = http.get(f"{api_base}/api/assets/{aid}", timeout=120)
detail = rg.json()
assert rg.status_code == 200
asset_filename = get_asset_filename(detail["asset_hash"], ".safetensors")
abs_path = comfy_tmp_base_dir / "models" / "checkpoints" / asset_filename
assert abs_path.exists()
abs_path.unlink()
r2 = http.get(f"{api_base}/api/assets/{aid}/content", timeout=120)
assert r2.status_code == 404
body = r2.json()
assert body["error"]["code"] == "FILE_NOT_FOUND"
finally:
# We created asset without the "unit-tests" tag(see `autoclean_unit_test_assets`), we need to clear it manually.
fix(assets): remove unused delete_content param from deleteAsset (#14241) * fix(assets): remove unused delete_content param from deleteAsset The delete_content query param on DELETE /api/assets/{id} was introduced in #12125 and had its default flipped to false in #12621. In practice no client sends it: the frontend issues a bare DELETE /assets/{id}, so every real caller already gets the default soft-delete (the reference is hidden, content preserved). The only thing that set delete_content=true was this repo's own test teardown. Remove the param from the route and the OpenAPI spec so the contract matches what clients actually use (and lines up with the cloud surface). The route now always soft-deletes. The underlying delete_asset_reference helper keeps its delete_content_if_orphan option, so orphan reclamation remains available internally for a future GC path — it's just no longer exposed on the public endpoint. Tests that used delete_content=true for hard cleanup now soft-delete; test_delete_upon_reference_count asserts content preservation instead of orphan removal. * test/docs: address review on deleteAsset delete_content removal - Rename test_delete_upon_reference_count -> test_soft_delete_preserves_asset_identity_across_references; the old name implied last-ref cleanup, but it now verifies the opposite (soft delete preserves identity across references). - Strengthen the re-association assertion: also check asset_hash == src_hash so it proves content reuse rather than relying on the now-tautological created_new is False. - Document delete_asset_reference: the orphan-reclamation branch is intentionally internal-only; the public endpoint always soft-deletes. - Normalize the soft-delete comment phrasing. * test(assets): make seed content unique per test for isolation Removing the delete_content param means delete is always a soft delete, so content created by one test now survives into the next. The suite had been relying on hard-delete teardown for isolation, so shared fixed-content fixtures started colliding: seeded_asset (b"A"*4096) and make_asset_bytes (deterministic on name) produced the same hash every test, so the second seed deduped to the surviving asset and returned 200 instead of 201, cascading into ~14 failures/errors. Salt both fixtures with a per-test uuid so each test creates fresh content (created_new True, 201), while keeping content deterministic within a test (same name/size -> same bytes) and preserving exact byte length so size-based list/sort assertions are unaffected.
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dr = http.delete(f"{api_base}/api/assets/{aid}", timeout=120)
dr.content
@pytest.mark.skip(reason="Requires computing hashes of files in directories to deduplicate into multiple cache states")
@pytest.mark.parametrize("root", ["input", "output"])
def test_download_404_if_all_states_missing(
root: str,
http: requests.Session,
api_base: str,
comfy_tmp_base_dir: Path,
asset_factory,
make_asset_bytes,
run_scan_and_wait,
):
"""Multi-state asset: after the last remaining on-disk file is removed, download must return 404."""
scope = f"dl-404-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:6]}"
name = "missing_all_states.bin"
data = make_asset_bytes(name, 2048)
# Upload -> path1
a = asset_factory(name, [root, "unit-tests", scope], {}, data)
aid = a["id"]
base = comfy_tmp_base_dir / root / "unit-tests" / scope
p1 = base / get_asset_filename(a["asset_hash"], ".bin")
assert p1.exists()
# Seed a second state and dedupe
p2 = base / "copy" / name
p2.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
p2.write_bytes(data)
trigger_sync_seed_assets(http, api_base)
run_scan_and_wait(root)
# Remove first file -> download should still work via the second state
p1.unlink()
ok1 = http.get(f"{api_base}/api/assets/{aid}/content", timeout=120)
b1 = ok1.content
assert ok1.status_code == 200 and b1 == data
# Remove the last file -> download must 404
p2.unlink()
r2 = http.get(f"{api_base}/api/assets/{aid}/content", timeout=120)
body = r2.json()
assert r2.status_code == 404
assert body["error"]["code"] == "FILE_NOT_FOUND"