trailofbits__skills/plugins/constant-time-analysis

Constant-Time Analyzer (ct-analyzer)

A portable tool for detecting timing side-channel vulnerabilities in compiled cryptographic code. Analyzes assembly output from multiple compilers and architectures to detect instructions that could leak secret data through execution timing.

Background

Timing side-channel attacks exploit variations in execution time to extract secret information from cryptographic implementations. Common sources include:

• Hardware division (DIV, IDIV): Execution time varies based on operand values
• Floating-point operations (FDIV, FSQRT): Variable latency based on inputs
• Conditional branches: Different execution paths have different timing

The infamous KyberSlash attack demonstrated how division instructions in post-quantum cryptographic implementations could be exploited to recover secret keys.

Features

• Multi-language support: C, C++, Go, Rust, Swift, Java, Kotlin, C#, PHP, JavaScript, TypeScript, Python, Ruby
• Multi-architecture support: x86_64, ARM64, ARM, RISC-V, PowerPC, s390x, i386
• Multi-compiler support: GCC, Clang, Go compiler, Rustc, Swiftc
• Bytecode support: Java/Kotlin (JVM), C# (CIL), PHP (VLD/opcache), JavaScript/TypeScript (V8 bytecode), Python (dis), Ruby (YARV)
• Optimization-level testing: Test across O0-O3, Os, Oz
• Multiple output formats: Text, JSON, GitHub Actions annotations
• Cross-compilation: Analyze code for different target architectures

Quick Start

# Install
uv tool install .

# Analyze a C file
ct-analyzer crypto.c

Usage

Basic Analysis

ct-analyzer <source_file>

Options

Option	Description
--arch, -a	Target architecture (x86_64, arm64, arm, riscv64, ppc64le, s390x, i386)
--compiler, -c	Compiler to use (gcc, clang, go, rustc)
--opt-level, -O	Optimization level (O0, O1, O2, O3, Os, Oz) - default: O2
--warnings, -w	Include conditional branch warnings
--func, -f	Regex pattern to filter functions
--json	Output JSON format
--github	Output GitHub Actions annotations
--list-arch	List supported architectures

Examples

# Test with different optimization levels
ct-analyzer --opt-level O0 crypto.c
ct-analyzer --opt-level O3 crypto.c

# Cross-compile for ARM64
ct-analyzer --arch arm64 crypto.c

# Include conditional branch warnings
ct-analyzer --warnings crypto.c

# Analyze specific functions
ct-analyzer --func 'decompose|sign' crypto.c

# JSON output for CI
ct-analyzer --json crypto.c

# Analyze Go code
ct-analyzer crypto.go

# Analyze Rust code
ct-analyzer crypto.rs

# Analyze PHP code (requires PHP with VLD extension or opcache)
ct-analyzer crypto.php

# Analyze TypeScript (transpiles to JS first)
ct-analyzer crypto.ts

# Analyze JavaScript (uses V8 bytecode analysis)
ct-analyzer crypto.js

# Analyze Python (uses dis module for bytecode disassembly)
ct-analyzer crypto.py

# Analyze Ruby (uses YARV instruction dump)
ct-analyzer crypto.rb

Detected Vulnerabilities

Error-Level (Must Fix)

Category	x86_64	ARM64	RISC-V
Integer Division	DIV, IDIV, DIVQ, IDIVQ	UDIV, SDIV	DIV, DIVU, REM, REMU
FP Division	DIVSS, DIVSD, DIVPS, DIVPD	FDIV	FDIV.S, FDIV.D
Square Root	SQRTSS, SQRTSD, SQRTPS, SQRTPD	FSQRT	FSQRT.S, FSQRT.D

Warning-Level (Review Needed)

Conditional branches that may leak timing if condition depends on secret data:

• x86: JE, JNE, JZ, JNZ, JA, JB, JG, JL, etc.
• ARM: BEQ, BNE, CBZ, CBNZ, TBZ, TBNZ
• RISC-V: BEQ, BNE, BLT, BGE

Scripting Language Support

PHP Analysis

PHP analysis uses either the VLD extension (recommended) or opcache debug output:

Detected PHP Vulnerabilities:

Category	Pattern	Recommendation
Division	ZEND_DIV, ZEND_MOD	Use Barrett reduction
Cache timing	chr(), ord()	Use pack('C', $int) / unpack('C', $char)[1]
Table lookups	bin2hex(), hex2bin(), base64_encode()	Use constant-time alternatives
Array access	FETCH_DIM_R (secret index)	Use constant-time table lookup
Bit shifts	ZEND_SL, ZEND_SR (secret amount)	Mask shift amount
Variable encoding	pack(), serialize(), json_encode()	Use fixed-length output
Weak RNG	rand(), mt_rand(), uniqid()	Use random_int() / random_bytes()
String comparison	strcmp(), === on secrets	Use hash_equals()

Installation:

# Install VLD extension (recommended)
# Query latest version from PECL
VLD_VERSION=$(curl -s https://pecl.php.net/package/vld | grep -oP 'vld-\K[0-9.]+(?=\.tgz)' | head -1)
pecl install channel://pecl.php.net/vld-${VLD_VERSION}

# Or build from source (if PECL fails)
git clone https://github.com/derickr/vld.git && cd vld
phpize && ./configure && make && sudo make install

# Or use opcache (built-in, fallback)
# Enabled by default in PHP 7+

JavaScript/TypeScript Analysis

JavaScript analysis uses V8 bytecode via Node.js --print-bytecode. TypeScript files are automatically transpiled first.

Detected JS Vulnerabilities:

Category	Pattern	Recommendation
Division	Div, Mod bytecodes	Use constant-time multiply-shift
Array access	LdaKeyedProperty (secret index)	Use constant-time table lookup
Bit shifts	ShiftLeft, ShiftRight (secret amount)	Mask shift amount
Variable encoding	TextEncoder, JSON.stringify(), btoa()	Use fixed-length output
Weak RNG	Math.random()	Use crypto.getRandomValues() or crypto.randomBytes()
Variable latency	Math.sqrt(), Math.pow()	Avoid in crypto paths
String comparison	=== on secrets	Use crypto.timingSafeEqual() (Node.js)
Early-exit search	indexOf(), includes()	Use constant-time comparison

Requirements:

# Node.js required
node --version

# TypeScript compiler (optional, for .ts files)
npm install -g typescript

Python Analysis

Python analysis uses the built-in dis module to analyze CPython bytecode.

Detected Python Vulnerabilities:

Category	Pattern	Recommendation
Division	BINARY_OP 11 (/), BINARY_OP 6 (%)	Use Barrett reduction or constant-time alternatives
Array access	BINARY_SUBSCR (secret index)	Use constant-time table lookup
Bit shifts	BINARY_LSHIFT, BINARY_RSHIFT (secret amount)	Mask shift amount
Variable encoding	int.to_bytes(), json.dumps(), base64.b64encode()	Use fixed-length output
Weak RNG	random.random(), random.randint()	Use secrets.token_bytes() / secrets.randbelow()
Variable latency	math.sqrt(), math.pow()	Avoid in crypto paths
String comparison	== on secrets	Use hmac.compare_digest()
Early-exit search	.find(), .startswith()	Use constant-time comparison

Requirements:

# Python 3.x required (built-in dis module)
uv run python --version

Ruby Analysis

Ruby analysis uses YARV (Yet Another Ruby VM) bytecode via ruby --dump=insns.

Detected Ruby Vulnerabilities:

Category	Pattern	Recommendation
Division	opt_div, opt_mod	Use constant-time alternatives
Array access	opt_aref (secret index)	Use constant-time table lookup
Bit shifts	opt_lshift, opt_rshift (secret amount)	Mask shift amount
Variable encoding	pack(), to_json(), Base64.encode64()	Use fixed-length output
Weak RNG	rand(), Random.new	Use SecureRandom.random_bytes()
Variable latency	Math.sqrt()	Avoid in crypto paths
String comparison	== on secrets	Use Rack::Utils.secure_compare() or OpenSSL
Early-exit search	.include?(), .start_with?()	Use constant-time comparison

Requirements:

# Ruby required (YARV is standard since Ruby 1.9)
ruby --version

Example Output

============================================================
Constant-Time Analysis Report
============================================================
Source: decompose.c
Architecture: arm64
Compiler: clang
Optimization: O2
Functions analyzed: 4
Instructions analyzed: 88

VIOLATIONS FOUND:
----------------------------------------
[ERROR] SDIV
  Function: decompose_vulnerable
  Reason: SDIV has early termination optimization; execution time depends on operand values

[ERROR] SDIV
  Function: use_hint_vulnerable
  Reason: SDIV has early termination optimization; execution time depends on operand values

----------------------------------------
Result: FAILED
Errors: 2, Warnings: 0

Fixing Violations

Replace Division with Barrett Reduction

// VULNERABLE
int32_t q = a / divisor;

// SAFE: Barrett reduction
// Precompute: mu = ceil(2^32 / divisor)
uint32_t q = (uint32_t)(((uint64_t)a * mu) >> 32);

Replace Branches with Constant-Time Selection

// VULNERABLE
if (secret) {
    result = a;
} else {
    result = b;
}

// SAFE: Constant-time selection
uint32_t mask = -(uint32_t)(secret != 0);
result = (a & mask) | (b & ~mask);

Replace Comparisons

// VULNERABLE
if (memcmp(a, b, len) == 0) { ... }

// SAFE: Use crypto/subtle or equivalent
if (subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(a, b) == 1) { ... }

Test Samples

The repository includes test samples demonstrating vulnerable and secure implementations:

• ct_analyzer/tests/test_samples/decompose_vulnerable.c - Vulnerable C implementation
• ct_analyzer/tests/test_samples/decompose_constant_time.c - Constant-time C implementation
• ct_analyzer/tests/test_samples/decompose_vulnerable.go - Vulnerable Go implementation
• ct_analyzer/tests/test_samples/decompose_vulnerable.rs - Vulnerable Rust implementation
• ct_analyzer/tests/test_samples/vulnerable.php - Vulnerable PHP implementation
• ct_analyzer/tests/test_samples/vulnerable.ts - Vulnerable TypeScript implementation
• ct_analyzer/tests/test_samples/vulnerable.py - Vulnerable Python implementation
• ct_analyzer/tests/test_samples/vulnerable.rb - Vulnerable Ruby implementation

These implement the Decompose and UseHint algorithms from ML-DSA (FIPS-204) as test cases.

CI Integration

GitHub Actions

name: Constant-Time Check

on: [push, pull_request]

jobs:
  ct-check:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4

      - name: Set up Python
        uses: actions/setup-python@v5
        with:
          python-version: '3.11'

      - name: Install dependencies
        run: |
          uv tool install .
          echo "$HOME/.local/bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"

      - name: Check constant-time properties
        run: |
          ct-analyzer --github src/crypto/*.c

GitLab CI

ct-check:
  stage: test
  script:
    - uv tool install .
    - export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"
    - ct-analyzer --json src/crypto/*.c > ct-report.json
  artifacts:
    reports:
      codequality: ct-report.json

Limitations

1. Compiler Output Analysis: Analyzes what the compiler produces, not runtime behavior. Cannot detect:

   • Cache timing attacks from memory access patterns
   • Microarchitectural side-channels (Spectre, etc.)
   • Processor-specific optimizations

2. No Data Flow Analysis: Flags all dangerous instructions regardless of whether they operate on secret data. Manual review is needed to determine if flagged code handles secrets. This means false positives are expected - for example, division used in loop bounds with public constants will be flagged even though it's not a vulnerability.

3. False Positive Verification: For each flagged violation, verify the operands:

   • If operands are compile-time constants or public parameters → likely false positive
   • If operands are derived from keys, plaintext, or secrets → true positive
   • See the SKILL.md documentation for detailed triage guidance

4. Compiler Variations: Different compilers/versions may produce different assembly. Test with:

   • Multiple optimization levels
   • Multiple compilers
   • Target production architectures

5. Scripting Languages: PHP, JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, and Ruby are supported via bytecode analysis.

Running Tests

uv run python ct_analyzer/tests/test_analyzer.py

References

• Cryptocoding Guidelines
• KyberSlash Attack
• NIST FIPS 204: ML-DSA
• Trail of Bits ML-DSA Implementation

Acknowledgments

Based on the test_ct utility created for ML-DSA.