* insecure-defaults: convert the skill to a dynamic workflow Rewrites the plugin as a four-phase workflow: recon profiles the target, parallel sweeps collect candidates, a refuting pass adjudicates them, and a report assigns severity with coverage accounting. The skill is removed and `/insecure-defaults:audit [path]` is the only entry point, since the workflow needs the command to locate its detection corpora. It also adds offline tests: scenarios over the workflow's control flow, a mutation self-test that proves they bite, and a check that every documented example is matched by a seed pattern. This does not replace running the command end-to-end against a real codebase. Bumps to 2.0.0. * insecure-defaults: run the node suites in CI The harness and seed-coverage checks ran only when someone remembered to. CI's shell-suite discovery matches plugins/*/tests/run_*.sh, so wrap the three node invocations in run_seeds.sh and both the lint workflow and `make shell-suites` pick them up with no changes to either. Without this, adding a row to CATEGORIES without its references/<id>.json passes CI and then aborts every real run with corpus-unreadable. No setup-node step: ubuntu-latest ships Node, and the scripts are plain CommonJS with no dependencies. The command -v guard makes a missing interpreter a loud failure rather than a suite that quietly does not run. * insecure-defaults: abort when the verify phase adjudicates nothing If every verify batch died, confirmed was empty and the run returned no-findings-confirmed, which commands/audit.md considers a completed audit. Guard on unadjudicated.length === candidates.length and return verify-failed, carrying coverage so the caller sees what went unjudged. Adds a scenario for both failure shapes (all agents dead, all verdict lists empty) and two mutations covering the guard firing and over-firing. * insecure-defaults: report per-category scan counts The zero-scanned guard is on the sum, so five failed searches beside one that worked cleared it and categories_run listed all six. Add files_scanned_by_category and unsearched_categories to coverage, keyed off CATEGORIES so a dead sweep counts as 0, and have the report name them under a Not searched heading. Adds a scenario covering a searching sweep, a zero-file one and a dead one, plus three mutations. * insecure-defaults: count sweep failures against the category list The corpus-unreadable note and the seed-only log divided by the sweeps that returned, so with sweeps dead the ratio read 1/1 rather than 1/6. * insecure-defaults: drop the assertion-count floor from the harness * insecure-defaults: guard a dead report agent agent() returns null on terminal failure, so a report agent that died returned status "findings" with no report and the caller printed nothing while the findings sat in the structured return. Return report-failed with the findings and coverage, and have the command render them. * insecure-defaults: stop labelling a genuine clean run a failure Step 3 accepted findings/no-findings-confirmed and called every other status an incomplete audit, so no-candidates, the deliberate honest-negative status, told the user the run failed. It is now a per-status table. * insecure-defaults: anchor the noisiest seeds (DES|RC4|...) matched NODES and MODES, 0o?(666|777|...) matched any digits, and getMessage() matched all Java exception handling. On the Python stdlib the first two drop from 147 and 228 matching lines to 0 and 84. random. and getMessage() can't be fixed by anchoring, so they now require context: a security-material identifier near the RNG call, and concatenation into a string literal for getMessage(). seed-coverage.js confirms all 18 documented VULNERABLE examples still match. * insecure-defaults: indent the seed wrapper the way shfmt wants --------- Co-authored-by: kz-tob <kara.zaffarano@trailofbits.com>
2.1 KiB
Fallback Secrets
Report when: A default value supplied when the env var is absent, where that value feeds signing, encryption, session, or token machinery.
Skip when: Defaults generated per-boot at random. Values only used as cache keys or correlation ids.
The decisive question is not whether a literal exists. It is whether the app runs with it. env.get(X, Y) runs; env[X] crashes. That difference is the whole finding.
VULNERABLE - Report These
Python: Environment variable with fallback
# File: src/auth/jwt.py
SECRET_KEY = os.environ.get('SECRET_KEY', 'dev-secret-key-123')
# Used in security context
def create_token(user_id):
return jwt.encode({'user_id': user_id}, SECRET_KEY, algorithm='HS256')
Why vulnerable: App runs with known secret if SECRET_KEY is missing. Attacker can forge tokens.
JavaScript: Logical OR fallback
// File: config/database.js
const DB_PASSWORD = process.env.DB_PASSWORD || 'admin123';
const pool = new Pool({
user: 'admin',
password: DB_PASSWORD,
database: 'production'
});
Why vulnerable: Database accepts hardcoded password in production if env var missing.
Ruby: fetch with default
# File: config/secrets.rb
Rails.application.credentials.secret_key_base =
ENV.fetch('SECRET_KEY_BASE', 'fallback-secret-base')
Why vulnerable: Rails session encryption uses weak known key as fallback.
SECURE - Skip These
Fail-secure: Crashes without config
# File: src/auth/jwt.py
SECRET_KEY = os.environ['SECRET_KEY'] # Raises KeyError if missing
# App won't start without SECRET_KEY - fail-secure
Explicit validation
// File: config/database.js
if (!process.env.DB_PASSWORD) {
throw new Error('DB_PASSWORD environment variable required');
}
const DB_PASSWORD = process.env.DB_PASSWORD;
Test fixtures (clearly scoped)
# File: tests/fixtures/auth.py
TEST_SECRET = 'test-secret-key-123' # OK - test-only
# Usage in test
def test_token_creation():
token = create_token('user1', secret=TEST_SECRET)