Files
Thomas Chauchefoin 82e8e0ad77 insecure-defaults: convert the skill to a dynamic workflow (#224)
* insecure-defaults: convert the skill to a dynamic workflow

Rewrites the plugin as a four-phase workflow: recon profiles the target,
parallel sweeps collect candidates, a refuting pass adjudicates them,
and a report assigns severity with coverage accounting.

The skill is removed and `/insecure-defaults:audit [path]` is the only
entry point, since the workflow needs the command to locate its
detection corpora.

It also adds offline tests: scenarios over the workflow's control flow, a
mutation self-test that proves they bite, and a check that every documented
example is matched by a seed pattern. This does not replace running the
command end-to-end against a real codebase.

Bumps to 2.0.0.

* insecure-defaults: run the node suites in CI

The harness and seed-coverage checks ran only when someone remembered to.
CI's shell-suite discovery matches plugins/*/tests/run_*.sh, so wrap the
three node invocations in run_seeds.sh and both the lint workflow and
`make shell-suites` pick them up with no changes to either.

Without this, adding a row to CATEGORIES without its references/<id>.json
passes CI and then aborts every real run with corpus-unreadable.

No setup-node step: ubuntu-latest ships Node, and the scripts are plain
CommonJS with no dependencies. The command -v guard makes a missing
interpreter a loud failure rather than a suite that quietly does not run.

* insecure-defaults: abort when the verify phase adjudicates nothing

If every verify batch died, confirmed was empty and the run returned
no-findings-confirmed, which commands/audit.md considers a completed
audit. Guard on unadjudicated.length === candidates.length and return
verify-failed, carrying coverage so the caller sees what went unjudged.

Adds a scenario for both failure shapes (all agents dead, all verdict lists
empty) and two mutations covering the guard firing and over-firing.

* insecure-defaults: report per-category scan counts

The zero-scanned guard is on the sum, so five failed searches beside one
that worked cleared it and categories_run listed all six. Add
files_scanned_by_category and unsearched_categories to coverage, keyed off
CATEGORIES so a dead sweep counts as 0, and have the report name them under
a Not searched heading.

Adds a scenario covering a searching sweep, a zero-file one and a dead one,
plus three mutations.

* insecure-defaults: count sweep failures against the category list

The corpus-unreadable note and the seed-only log divided by the sweeps that
returned, so with sweeps dead the ratio read 1/1 rather than 1/6.

* insecure-defaults: drop the assertion-count floor from the harness

* insecure-defaults: guard a dead report agent

agent() returns null on terminal failure, so a report agent that died
returned status "findings" with no report and the caller printed nothing
while the findings sat in the structured return. Return report-failed with
the findings and coverage, and have the command render them.

* insecure-defaults: stop labelling a genuine clean run a failure

Step 3 accepted findings/no-findings-confirmed and called every other status
an incomplete audit, so no-candidates, the deliberate honest-negative status,
told the user the run failed. It is now a per-status table.

* insecure-defaults: anchor the noisiest seeds

(DES|RC4|...) matched NODES and MODES, 0o?(666|777|...) matched any digits,
and getMessage() matched all Java exception handling. On the Python stdlib the
first two drop from 147 and 228 matching lines to 0 and 84.

random. and getMessage() can't be fixed by anchoring, so they now require
context: a security-material identifier near the RNG call, and concatenation
into a string literal for getMessage(). seed-coverage.js confirms all 18
documented VULNERABLE examples still match.

* insecure-defaults: indent the seed wrapper the way shfmt wants

---------

Co-authored-by: kz-tob <kara.zaffarano@trailofbits.com>
2026-08-05 08:21:33 -04:00

2.1 KiB

Fallback Secrets

Report when: A default value supplied when the env var is absent, where that value feeds signing, encryption, session, or token machinery.

Skip when: Defaults generated per-boot at random. Values only used as cache keys or correlation ids.

The decisive question is not whether a literal exists. It is whether the app runs with it. env.get(X, Y) runs; env[X] crashes. That difference is the whole finding.

VULNERABLE - Report These

Python: Environment variable with fallback

# File: src/auth/jwt.py
SECRET_KEY = os.environ.get('SECRET_KEY', 'dev-secret-key-123')

# Used in security context
def create_token(user_id):
    return jwt.encode({'user_id': user_id}, SECRET_KEY, algorithm='HS256')

Why vulnerable: App runs with known secret if SECRET_KEY is missing. Attacker can forge tokens.

JavaScript: Logical OR fallback

// File: config/database.js
const DB_PASSWORD = process.env.DB_PASSWORD || 'admin123';

const pool = new Pool({
  user: 'admin',
  password: DB_PASSWORD,
  database: 'production'
});

Why vulnerable: Database accepts hardcoded password in production if env var missing.

Ruby: fetch with default

# File: config/secrets.rb
Rails.application.credentials.secret_key_base =
  ENV.fetch('SECRET_KEY_BASE', 'fallback-secret-base')

Why vulnerable: Rails session encryption uses weak known key as fallback.

SECURE - Skip These

Fail-secure: Crashes without config

# File: src/auth/jwt.py
SECRET_KEY = os.environ['SECRET_KEY']  # Raises KeyError if missing

# App won't start without SECRET_KEY - fail-secure

Explicit validation

// File: config/database.js
if (!process.env.DB_PASSWORD) {
  throw new Error('DB_PASSWORD environment variable required');
}
const DB_PASSWORD = process.env.DB_PASSWORD;

Test fixtures (clearly scoped)

# File: tests/fixtures/auth.py
TEST_SECRET = 'test-secret-key-123'  # OK - test-only

# Usage in test
def test_token_creation():
    token = create_token('user1', secret=TEST_SECRET)