Dragan Spiridonov b1a462fba2 feat(mcp): protocol-compliance smoke + tool-parity audit (#510 item 4) ...

Ports ruflo's #1874 discipline. Replaces the FAKE mcp:validate theater
(echo 'All tools registered' && exit 0) with a real smoke that boots the
actual MCP server (tsx src/mcp/entry.ts) over stdio and validates the
initialize + tools/list handshake against the MCP SPEC, not the code:
  - protocolVersion is a YYYY-MM-DD string (the core ruflo #1874 guard — an
    object here is what Claude Code's Zod rejects)
  - capabilities is an object; serverInfo.name/version are non-empty strings
  - tools/list returns a non-empty array, each entry name + object inputSchema

scripts/audit-mcp-tool-parity.mjs is the AQE-equivalent of ruflo's CLI<->MCP
parity audit (the CLI has no callMCPTool('name') string pattern, so the
meaningful surface is advertisement<->handler parity). Drives the advertised
set from a live tools/list, diffs a monotone baseline
(verification/mcp-tool-parity-baseline.json, 86 tools), fails only on NEW
discrepancies (removed tool = regression), and probes that unknown-tool
tools/call is rejected. --update-baseline to re-baseline.

Both scripts spawn the server against an isolated AQE_PROJECT_ROOT temp dir
(data protection: real .agentic-qe/*.rvf proven byte-identical before/after)
and kill the whole detached process group on exit (no leaked servers).

Verified: npm run mcp:validate -> PASS (protocolVersion 2025-11-25, 86 tools);
mcp:parity -> PASS (0 removed, 0 added). Both exit 0, real stores untouched.

Side-finding (pre-existing, not fixed here): handleToolsCall throws a plain
object for unknown tools, which escapes the request-handler safety net as
'Internal error: [object Object]' instead of a proper JSON-RPC -32601. Logged
for a dedicated fix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-06-02 09:40:51 +00:00

..

mcp-tool-parity-baseline.json

feat(mcp): protocol-compliance smoke + tool-parity audit (#510 item 4)

2026-06-02 09:40:51 +00:00